

The Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20505

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National Intelligence Council

NIC# 02046-88  
7 June 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM: MG Larry D. Budge, USA  
National Intelligence Officer for  
General Purpose Forces

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference for SNIE 11-16-88: The Likelihood and  
Implications of a Soviet Conventional Arms Control Gambit

REFERENCE: Memo to DCI fm NIO/GPF, dtd 27 May 88, Same Subject

1. This is for your information and review. The coordination meeting for National Foreign Intelligence Board representatives is scheduled to be held 28 June 1988. The Senior Review Panel has reviewed the Terms of Reference for subject SNIE and their comments are discussed in the following paragraphs.

2. We recognize and concur in the Senior Review Panel's caution that manageability of such complex political/economic/military issues will pose difficulties in maintenance of a tight focus for the paper. We hope to produce a clear, concise assessment of no more than 20 pages. We will attempt to treat the issues in sufficient detail without exhaustive narrative.

3. In response to the SRP comments on Parameters:

- ° Scope. We will briefly address the Far East and other significant areas but will concentrate on the Atlantic-to-Urals region where we expect the Soviets to aim their proposals.
- ° Time frame. As noted, the SNIE will look approximately one-two years ahead.
- ° CBW. Since the Soviets consider CBW "weapons of mass destruction," and there are arms control agreements already existing on many of these weapons, we do not intend to cover them in the SNIE.

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- ° Past Soviet Initiatives. We concur with the suggestion to concentrate our review on arms control initiatives made in the Gorbachev era.
- ° Negotiations Versus Unilateral: Without going into all the permutations, we will attempt to deal with a combination of the two. This could perhaps be one of Gorbachev's most compelling "Gambits."

4. We have already developed several matrices to match arms reduction proposals with economic benefits. We will continue to refine these matrices with the assistance of defense economic experts to make them meaningful and allow us to present these complex issues in a short, clear estimate.

  
Larry D. Budge

Attachment:  
Terms of Reference

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